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Household income is one of the most common variables in economic models. 
Theory and logic tells us that it will influence a whole range of household choices, from 
the decision to go to school, to the decisions to change jobs or move. Income is also used 
in range of political science and sociological models. These models use income and 
relative economic position to explain political and social behavior. On the face of it 
income seems to be a straightforward concept, once you have included and excluded all 
relevant income streams. It also seems reasonable to assume that individual households 
know their income, and make decisions based on that knowledge. 
What if, however, households don't really know how much they earn? Or, more 
accurately, what if they know how much they earn, but they don't really know the 
significance of their income relative to others? 
This is one question that emerges from the research discussed in this paper. Based 
on interview data, this exploratory study finds several trends about perceptions of income 
and income inequality on which further research could be based. Among them is the fact 
that most people are not able to accurately place their income on a schematic 
representation of the overall income distribution. Other findings suggest that certain 
groups of people are most interested in changing income distribution. Still others suggest 
that most people judge their income and income satisfaction by comparing themselves to 
people who are like them - people who live near them, have similar education to them, 
and look like them. 
These and other findings will be discussed in this paper. It will examine in tum 
the respondents ' perceptions and opinions about income inequality, their perceptions 
about their own income, their opinions about equality and inequality in the abstract, and 
the models they seem to use to explain economic change. 
Before turning to the data, however, I will discuss briefly previous research in this 
area and provide a description of the data set and data collection process. 
Previous research 
While economists have written volumes on economic inequality, research on 
perceptions of income difference is scarce. There are a handful of sources, however. One 
is survey data, which provides a basic framework of what people think, but is limited in 
its depth. Other research has examined in depth the way people create and apply their 
ideas about fairness and equality, but not in the specific context of incomes. Another area 
discusses the way people seek status and compare themselves to others. I will provide a 
brief discussion of each. 
Survey data on economic inequality is summarized in Everett Ladd and Karlyn 
Bowman's Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality. By using data from the General Social 
Survey, as well as other survey data sources, the two propose that Americans are 
ambivalent about inequality, largely because they have faith in opportunity. People 
admire hard work and feel it creates opportunity for everyone to succeed economically. 
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However, a minority of people, approximately 20 percent, don't think hard work will 
necessarily earn economic success. 1 
Survey data shows that Americans are ambivalent about wealth, but not resentful. 
Wealth is seen as a necessary part of our economic and political system. The data also 
suggests that Americans reject the notion that our economic system is one of "have's" 
and "have no1's.,,2 
Ladd and Bowman write that Americans tend to be neutral about issues of income 
difference: "We are a vast middle class relatively satisfied with what we have and aware 
that many things we have are more important than money.,,3 They conclude that 
Americans are more concerned with inequality and difference in the political sphere than 
the economic one. 
Other research, derived from in-depth interviews with 30 adults, comes to a 
similar conclusion. Jennifer Hochschild writes in her book, What's Fair? American 
Beliefs about Distributive Justice, that Americans feel a deep sense of ambivalence about 
economic inequality and redistribution of economic resources. Hoschild's research didn't 
just center on economic equality but social and political equality as well. She analyzed 
each interview in-depth, determining what sort of values the interviewee used to gauge 
fairness in each of these spheres. She often found contradictions in the norms and ideals 
individuals spoke of, and the actual world they experienced. She discusses the way that 
these contradictions affected the individuals. Some, Hoschild writes, become frustrated 
and alienated from the political, social or economic system. Others work to change the 
I Ladd and Bowman, p. 57 
2 Bowman and Ladd, p. 49 
3 Bowman and Ladd, p. 1 14 
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gaps they see between the ideal and the actual. Hoschild's work is very in-depth and 
investigates the intricacies of people's ideas about equality and fairness. She 
demonstrates that while people might give simple answers to questions about equality 
and fairness, complexities are just a few questions away. 
Hoschild finds that while her interviewees were generally supportive of equality 
in the political and social spheres, they were generally supportive of differentiation in the 
economic sphere. Despite this support, many do not think the differentiation that exists 
leaves fair results. She theorizes that this is largely because many American beliefs about 
equality and fairness contradict economic principles of competition. She writes 
Many of the poor and a surprising number of the rich do not seek redistribution, 
but are so ambivalent about their own distributive beliefs that they do not oppose 
redistribution as much as they fail to support any system of distributive justice 
very fully.4 
Her conclusion, though ambivalent itself, provides the basis on which this study can be 
justified. It is clear that the verdict on income inequality, and general inequality in the 
economic sphere, is still out. While there is a general approval of some differentiation, 
there is still a lot of discomfort with extremes. My research is - among other things - an 
attempt to better understand who is most uncomfortable with extreme incomes, and who 
might want to change them. 
The last area of previous research describes the way that people seek status and 
compare themselves to others. In Choosing the Right Pond Robert Frank shows the way 
that concerns about local status and relative social position permeate many economic and 
social phenomena. He begins with a discuss on wages in many occupations and firms. 
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Frank. writes that wages often reflect relative status in the hierarchy of a finn more than 
they reflect individual contributions to production. He also gives many examples of cases 
where high status is exchanged for higher wages. 
Frank's argument continues, as he looks at the tension between collective and 
individual concerns as it applies to taxation, unions, education and other controversial 
economic institutions. He offers an interesting argument for a fundamental change in our 
welfare structure, one that accommodates individual's "evolutionary" interest in being 
better than those people around them.5 
Frank's arguments have interesting implications for the kind of research I have 
undertaken. He assumes from the start that inequality is in some sense desired by people 
since it is their means to define individual status. His ideas offer a convincing argument 
for why people who are critical of extreme poverty and wealth are also consistently 
hesitant to be too critical of the market system that creates those extremes. 
Data and Methodology 
Data for this research was collected through interviews with 40 adults in Lorain 
County, Ohio between December 1998 and January 1999. Potential interviewees were 
selected at random from within the five pre-determined communities: Sheffield Lake, 
A von Lake, Lorain, LaGrange and Oberlin. The communities were selected intentionally 
to offer the greatest range within the county; the communities include the county's richest 
community, poorest community, and communities with the most unifonn income 
4 Hochschild. p. 283. 
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distributions. The communities also include relatively urban and rural areas, areas with 
substantial racial diversity and areas with virtually no diversity at all. 
Data on the communities, including poverty rate, population, percent minority, 
gini coefficients and income distributions (all in 1970 and 1990) are provided in 
Appendix A. The median incomes range from $43,660 in Avon Lake to $22,695 in 
Lorain. Minorities range from 28 percent of the population in Oberlin, to 2 percent in 
Sheffield Lake.6 A complete breakdown, as well as graphical representations of the 
income distributions in each community, is included in Appendix A. Appendix B is a 
map of Lorain County. The five communities are marked. 
Once the communities were selected, random groups of 40 addresses were chosen 
in each one. These households received postcards telling them that their household had 
been chosen at random from all those in their community to participate in a survey about 
'jobs and income in Lorain County and the United States." In total, postcards were sent 
to 280 households, but approximately 10 percent were returned due to incorrect or 
outdated addresses. 
Addressees that received postcards were then telephoned. Of those households I 
reached over the phone, about 30 percent agreed to do an interview. A good proportion of 
the phone numbers, approximately 30 percent again, were disconnected or the wrong 
numbers. Two communities - LaGrange and Sheffield Lake - did not yield enough 
respondents the first time cards were sent out, and a second round of 40 cards was 
mailed. In total, of those people to whom postcards were sent, approximately 16 percent 
were interviewed. 
5 Frank, p. 268 
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The participants ranged in age from 22 to 85 years old, with a median age of 42. 
The sample is 10 percent African American and 57 percent female. The average percent 
minority for the five communities included is 12 percent. There are eight respondents 
from Avon Lake eight from Lorain, seven from both Oberlin and LaGrange, and 10 from 
Sheffield Lake. 
The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and an hour, depending entirely on how 
much the respondent had to say. Many questions on the survey were open-ended, so 
interviewees could talk as long as they liked. Once interviews were done, the data was 
coded and analyzed. 
The survey included sections about the household and the people in it, the 
household's economic past and future expectations, income inequality in the abstract and 
in specific situations, and observations about change in income distribution locally and 
nationally. Appendix C is a copy of the survey that was used. A summary of the survey 
results and definitions of some variables is included in Table 1 below. Appendix D is a 
correlation matrix between many of the descriptive variables I use throughout the paper 
as independent variables in regressions. 
Participants in the study received nothing for their time or effort. They received 
thank-you letters and an offer to receive a copy of the finished paper, which five 
requested. 
6 according to 1990 census information 
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Table 1. Survey results and variable definitions 
Question Variable 
"In what year were you born?" age 
"How long have you had your current job?" empLyears 
"How long have you lived in [community]?" years in comm. 
Median income of street, 1990 census actual income 
(Looking at scale from 1 to 5) "Imagine that perceived income 
all the households in the U.S. were arrange from 
richest to poorest. Imagine that 1 is the very 
poorest and 5 is the very richest. Where do ypu 
think your household would be?" This number was 
then translated into the appropriate income, using U.S. 
income distribution. 
Difference between actual and perceived income income difference 
"Is anyone in your household under 18?" child 
"Have you ever studied economics or business?" econ 
"Did you buy a lottery ticket last week?" lottery 
"Are you married?" married 
"Are you, or have you ever been, a union member?" union 
"Did you vote in the November 1998 election?" vote 
"Does anyone else in the household earn money?" dual income 
"Do you receive any government support, such as 
social security, disability or welfare?" government support 
"Have you lived anywhere else than Lorain Co.?" native 
"Do you subscribe to a newspaper, or read one daily?" newspaper 
"Do you think you will stay in your current job 





Mean Median (S.E.) 
41 45 (14) 
12 7 (12) 
15 9 15 
$44,68045,000 (11,050) 
$38,500 37,100 (14,473) 
































Question Variable Responses ( percent) 
"What is the highest level of education individual education 5 less than high school 
you've received?" 25 high school 
18 some college 
18 trade/technical school 
20 college 
15 post-graduate 
"Has anyone else in the household received househokleducation 5 less than high school 
more education?" (Take highest in household) 13 high school 
10 some college 
25 trade/technical school 
35 college 
13 post-graduate 
"Do your work?" "Full-time or part-time? employment status 13 Not employed 
"Are you retired? 23 Part-time 
55 Full-time 
10 Retired 
"Do you think your household's economic psec 63 improved 
security has improved, declined or stayed 18 declined 
the same in the last five years?" 20 stayed the same 
"Do you think your household' s standard psol 53 improved 
of living, and by this I mean what sorts 13 declined 
of things you can afford to buy and do, has 35 stayed the same 
improved, declined or stayed the same 
in the last five years?" 
Both psol and psec were scaled from past Mean = 2.85 
Zero to two, with two being improved, zero Median = 3 
Being decline. I added both psol and psec. S.E. = 1.33 
"Five years from now, do you expect your fsec 70 improve 
household's economic security to have improved, 15 decline 
declined or stayed the same?" 15 stay the same 
"Five years from now, do you expect your fsol 73 improve 
household's standard of living to have improved, 16 decline 
declined, or stayed the same?" 11 stay the same 
Sum of fsec and fsol (like past) future Mean = 3.4 
Median=4 
S.E. = 1.5 
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Question Variable Response (Percents) 
"Do you think the U.S. has a high level of highest 87.5 Yes 
income inequality relative to other countries 12.5 No 
in the industrialized world?" 
"Do you think the income distribution in the support dist. 46 Yes 
United States is too wide?" 54 Yes 
"If you could, would you like to change want change 44 Yes 
anything about the distribution of income 56 No 
in the United States?" 
"Do you think the distribution of income overall change 85 Yes 
in the U.S. has changed in the last 25 years?" 15 No 
(If yes to above) "Has that change been 'good' change positive 24 Yes 
in your opinion?" 76 No 
(If yes to above) "How has the overall distribution change description 33 Don't know 
changed? 33 Dichotoniizing 
12.5 More rich 
20 More poor 
"Is your household income less than enough, income satisfaction 22.5 Less 
enough, or more than enough to support your 65 Enough 
household with?" 10 More 
(If working) Do you think you are underpaid, fair pay 50 Underpaid 
overpaid or paid fairly?" 47 Paid fairly 
4 Overpaid 
"Do you think children are better off growing diversity 47.5 Diversity 
up in a neighborhood where the other children 52.5 Homogeneity 
are like them, or a place where some are better 
off and some are worse offthan them?" 
"Do you have children living at horneT' children 70 Yes 
30 No 
"What sort of work do you do?" empl. type 36 Professional 
49 Skilled 
15 Unskilled 
I will use these variables to look, in tum, at respondent' general attitudes about 
the income distribution, patterns in the actual and perceived income variables, and then at 
people's ideas about economic equality and mechanisms of economic change. 
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Recognition and approval of income distribution 
The first area of discussion deals with participants' general sentiments about 
income inequality in the United States. Do respondents think the United States has a high 
level of income inequality? Do they think the spectrum of incomes is too wide? Wide 
enough? Would they like to see anything change about the level of income inequality in 
the United States? My discussion of these questions will show that certain demographic 
groups -- especially women, union members and voters - are most likely to have negative 
feelings about the distribution of income and want to change it. Another group - people 
who have studied economics - are most likely to feel positively about the distribution of 
income and want no change. Notably, income does not significantly influence the 
respondents' answers. 
First, do people think the United States has a high level of income inequality? My 
data suggests that most people agree that the United States has a relatively high level of 
inequality, and that certain sub-groups of the sample are even more likely to think so. 
Seventy-five percent of the sample strongly agreed that the United States has "one of the 
highest levels of income inequality in the industrialized world." Table 2 shows the 
percent to agree in sub-groups within my data. 














Women* 86 10 5 
Men* 59 18 24 
Voters 73 13 13 
African Americans 75 0 25 
Caucasians 74 12 15 
College graduates 75 16 8 
High school graduate 81 10 10 
Studied economics* 59 18 24 
*indicates that the category is significantly different than the sample mean at the .05 level. 
Table 2 shows that while most sub-groups are not statistically different than the 
mean, women and economics students are. Women are significantly more likely to agree 
with the statement (men are significantly less likely) and people who have studied 
economics are significantly less likely to agree that the United States has a high level of 
ineqUality. 
Income level is also insignificant. Table 3 shows a regression of actual income 
and perceived on income on the variable "highest." 
Table 3. Regression of "highest" onto income-related variables. 
Dependant variable: highest 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.372361 0.590275 2.324953 0.0260 
PERCINC 9.20E-06 8. 16E-06 1.126574 0.2676 
ACTINCREAL -2.75E-06 1.07E-05 -0.257168 0.7986 
R-squared 0.036799 Mean dependent var 1.605263 
Adjusted R-squared -0.018241 S.D. dependent var 0.718086 
S.E. of regression 0.724606 Akaike info criterion 2.269278 
Sum squared resid 18.37687 Schwarz criterion 2.398561 
Log likelihood -40.11629 F-statistic 0.668579 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.292932 Prob(F-statistic) 0.518859 
This regression shows that income level does not predict whether a person will agree that 
the United States has a high level of income ineqUality. 
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These findings contradict intuitive assumptions about they way people learn about 
the distribution of income in the United States. People with more education do not differ 
from the mean, and while economic education is significant, it causes people to think that 
the United States doesn't have a high level of income inequality, an opinion contrary to 
fact.7 At the same time incomes - neither perceived nor actual - do not affect someone's 
likelihood to agree with the statement. Lastly, the only significant demographic 
characteristic is gender. It is important to recall, however, that the majority of people 
(87.5 percent) agree or strongly agree with the statement. 
Next, I will look at the question: Do people think incomes are too widely 
distributed in the United States? Not widely distributed enough? The data to answer these 
questions come from a general question asking if the respondent supports the distribution 
of income in the United States. As with the previous discussion, I will start by looking at 
simple percents and Anova analysis. Table 4 shows these data. 
Table 4. Percent of respondents to approve of the distribution of income in the United States 
approve disapprove 
Overall Sample 54 46 
Union members* 27 73 
Women 50 50 
Men 59 41 
Voters 48 52 
African Americans 25 75 
Caucasians 57 43 
College graduates 50 50 
High school graduate 54 46 
Studied economics 47 53 
Married people* 67 33 
*indicates that the category is significantly different than the sample mean at the .05 level. 
7 For a discussion see, for example, Smeeding, Timothy. "America's Income Inequality: Where do we 




Table 4 shows again, that while some sub-groups (in this case, union members 
and married people) differ significantly from the mean response, most do not. To further 
examine the responses to this question, I regressed the dichotomous dependent variable 
onto selected demographic variables as well as income-related variables. The results are 
displayed in Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Regression of "support distribution" onto selected demographic variables and 
income-related statistics. 
Dependent variable: support distribution. (Takes on value of 1 when respondent "approves" of 
distribution, 0 when they disapprove.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 4.669428 1.904329 2.452007 0.0142 
PERCINC 5.07E-06 1.72E-05 0.295321 0.7677 
RACE -2.631752 1.122696 -2.344136 0.0191 
SEX -0.772232 0.539339 -1.431813 0.1522 
UNION -1.508456 0.606294 -2.487994 0.0128 
VOTE -1.255126 0.683106 -1.837380 0.0662 
ACTINCREAL -6.71E-05 3.38E-05 -1.985109 0.0471 
' INEDU 0.088650 0.176555 0.502108 0.6156 
ECON 0.379711 0.616409 0.616005 0.5379 
Mean dependent var 0.538462 S.D. dependent var 0.505035 
S.E. of regression 0.468109 Akaike info criterion 1.472874 
Sum squared resid 6.573768 Schwarz criterion 1.856773 
Log likelihood -19.72104 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.610613 
Restr. log likelihood -26.91724 A vg. log likelihood -0.505668 
LR statistic (8 df) 14.39240 McFadden R-squared 0.267345 
Probability(LR stat) 0.072094 
Tables 4 and 5 taken together allow us to say something about who is more and 
less supportive of the income distribution. The regression shows that union members, 
women, African-Americans unmarried people and voters are all significantly more likely 
to disapprove of the income distribution. The regression also shows that while perceived, 
or reported, income is not statistically significant, actual income is. As a respondent's 
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actual income increased by one dollar, the probability they approved of the income 
distribution fell by .0006. 
There are some possible explanations for these results. I argue that voters and 
union members tend to be more critical of the world around them in general. They 
observe their communities, countries and workplaces and take action to affect them. In 
this sense my results aren't very surprising. Lastly, married people are more supportive 
because they are more economically secure than unmarried people.8 This security makes 
them more accepting of the range of incomes in the U.S. The risk to individuals that 
stems from a highly unequal income distribution, i.e. the risk you will be at the bottom, is 
less threatening to a potentially dual-income household. 
What is possibly most interesting, and most puzzling, about my results here is that 
higher incomes seems to cause people to be less supportive of the income distribution. 
One possibility is that income is correlated with education, a characteristic that could 
have an impact on people's ideas about income inequality. The regression results suggest, 
however, that education is not a significant predictor of whether a person approves of the 
income distribution. Even when actual income level is removed, education continues to 
be insignificant.9 
Research by Jennifer Hoschild offers an explanation for these seemingly 
confusing results. She writes that most of her respondents support what she calls "income 
differentiation." Even those people who had been strong supporters of equality in the 
political and social sphere were fairly unsupportive of equality in the economic domain. 
8 See, for example, Greg Hess's research on marriage as a hedge against risk. 
9 See Appendix E for these results. 
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While most of her sample support income differentiation, there were some differences 
between poor and rich respondents. She writes: 
Many of the rich are as distressed or angry as the poor are about discrepancies 
between ideal and actual economic differences. Even though they benefit from 
unequal distributions, they fear that others benefit much more and unfairly so. 
Even more strikingly, they are sometimes ambivalent about the justice of 
differentiation itself and feel uneasy about they own success and others' failure. 
Thus, Hoschild's research suggests that it shouldn't be too surprising to find that there is 
a negative relationship between income and support of the income distribution. Having a 
high income does not necessarily eliminate fears that others have more. On the other side 
of the coin, those people with high incomes might question how much the and others like 
them deserve their economic status. 
The last set of questions I need to answer in this section have to do with whether 
people would like to see the distribution of income change, and if so, what. Again, Table 
6 will show the general response to the question, "If you could change anything about the 
distribution of income in the United States, would you?" Table 7 displays regression 
results including income-related variables. 
Table 6. Percent of respondents who would like to change the income distribution 
want change don't want change 
Overall Sample 44 56 
Union members 72 18 
Women 59 41 
Men 59 41 
Voters * 68 32 
African Americans 50 50 
Caucasians 57 43 
College graduates 64 36 








*indicates that the category is significantly different than the sample mean at the .05 level. 
Table 7. Regression of ''want change" variable onto income-related variables and vote. 
Dependent variable: Dichotomous "Do you want change" variable. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.708146 1.484146 0.477140 0.6333 
PERCINC -5.68E-06 1.49E-05 -0.380389 0.7037 
ACTINCREAL -8.48E-06 2.09E-05 -0.405222 0.6853 
VOTE 0.868418 0.522591 1.661754 0.0966 
PAST 0.124918 0.166467 0.750406 0.4530 
. FUTURE -0.253750 0.169608 -1.496100 0.1346 
Mean dependent var 0.589744 S.D. dependent var 0.498310 
S.E. of regression 0.487254 Akaike info criterion 1.490660 
Sum squared resid 7.834747 Schwarz criterion 1.746592 
Log likelihood -23.06786 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.582486 
Restr. log likelihood -26.40112 A vg. log likelihood -0.591484 
LR statistic (5 df) 6.666510 McFadden R-squared 0.126254 
Probabilit~(LR stat) 0.246647 
Obs with Dep=O 16 Totalobs 39 
Obs with Dep= 1 23 
Tables 6 and 7 show that, again, income level does not influence the probability 
that someone will look for change in the income distribution. Voters are significantly 
more likely to want change. The possible reasons for this probably follow those discussed 
above. One interesting addition in this analysis is the addition of the two variables "past 
and "future" in the regression. These capture the respondent's recent economic 
experience and outlook; high values for past indicate people who have seen significant 
economic improvement in the last five years and high values for future indicate people 
who expect significant economic improvement in the next five years. While one's past 
economic experience isn't significant, the regression suggests that one's future outlook is 
marginally significant. 
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These results suggest that a model which attempts to identify people who would 
support redistribution of income should not simply assume that those who would benefit 
most from redistribution will be the most supportive. Instead, a model should identify 
more complex relationships that include people's interest in their communities and 
personal expectations. These results coincide with Hoschild's research; she finds that a 
person's ideology of fairness more important in fonning her ideas about economic 
equality than her economic position. 
There is one question left to answer. For those people who would like to see 
"change," what change do they want? While people had different answers to this 
question, the end result of their wishes was almost universally improving the economic 
well being of the poorest families. One-third of the respondents said this explicitly, while 
another third wished for more middle-class jobs. Clearly, if there were more middle-class 
jobs, fewer people would have to fill low-class jobs. A handful of people spoke of 
eliminating extreme wealth, and another handful mentioned other things, such as 
changing spending habits so less redistribution would be necessary to change the poor's 
standard of living. Despite different ways of saying it, however, the bottom line of most 
of these responses is a desire to increase the income of those at the bottom of the 
distribution. 
Overall change 
The next question addresses the dynamics of income distribution, not just its 
existence and level. If people observe and evaluate the level of income inequality at the 
current time, what do they have to say about the way income inequality has changed in 
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recent years? Again, what predicts whether a person believes there has been significant 
change in the level of income inequality? 
Initial analysis suggests that several variables, especially those relative to the 
respondent's "peer group," are significantly related the probability someone believes 
there has been change in the income distribution in the last 25 years. Table 8 below 
shows the levels of significance for many of the variables included in this data set. Those 
that are significant include 
Table 8. Percent of people who believe there has been a change in the national income 
distribution in the last 25 years, by descriptive variables. 
change no change 
Overall Sample 85 15 
Union members* 100 0 
Women 77 23 
Men 94 6 
Voters 87 13 
African Americans 87 13 
Caucasians 83 17 
College graduates 86 14 
High school graduate 86 14 
Studied economics 86 14 
Married people 80 20 
Lottery players 80 20 
*indicates that the category is significantly different than the sample mean at the .10 level. 
At first these results suggest that there is little difference between this variable 
and those discussed above. Union membership is the only significant variable, and only 
at the 10 percent level. But there is a significant trend within this "overall change" 
variable. This trend is related to the communities that respondents live in. For three of the 
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communities, LaGrange, A von and Lorain, every respondent agreed that things have 
change. The other two saw various levels of agreement. To examine this relationship, as 
well as the relationship between perceived change and income, I regressed the [erceived 
change variable onto several variables. The first measures the amount of change in the 
community's gini coefficient between 1970 and 1990. All five communities saw an 
increase in inequality (an increase in the gini), but they saw different levels. In addition to 
this variable and the income variables, I also included the variable "past," which was 
defined above. The results are reported in Table 9. 
Table 9. Regression of perceived overall change on income-related variables and others. 
Dependent variable: Dichotomous "overall change" variable. (Takes on value of 1 if respondent perceived 
national change, 0 if not) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 3.962533 2.945792 1.345150 0.1786 
GINICHANGE 15.88994 10.06992 1.577961 0.1146 
PAST -0.805056 0.478866 -1.681170 0.0927 
ACTINCREAL -4.59E-05 4.38E-05 -1.046318 0.2954 
PERCINC 3.53E-05 2.66E-05 1.328303 0.1841 
Mean dependent var 0.846154 S.D. dependent var 0.365518 
S.E. of regression 0.337029 Akaike info criterion 0.897004 
Sum squared resid 3.862020 Schwarz criterion 1.110281 
Log likelihood -12.49157 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.973526 
Restr. log likelihood -16.74360 A vg. log likelihood -0.320297 
LR statistic (4 df) 8.504051 McFadden R-squared 0.253949 
Probability(LR stat) 0.074765 
Obs with Dep=O 6 Totalobs 39 
Obs with Dep=1 33 
This regression shows that the amount of change in the local income distribution 
has a positive, marginally significant effect on the probability that a person has perceived 
change. Personal change, captured in the "past" variable, is also significant. The negative 
sign indicates that as a person's past economic experience improves, they are less likely 
to have perceived change in the overall income distribution. 
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These results clearly show that one's personal economic experience, as it is 
captured in the economic changes in one's community and one's reported economic 
history, both form one's perceptions of change in the income distribution. I argue that the 
union variable that was found marginally significant above fits in this story since union 
workers have seen a significant decline in the last 20 years. These results suggest that 
people who have seen significant economic changes in their lives will assume that that 
change permeated the entire economy. 
Conclusions 
Most significantly, the data presented thus far shows that identification of income 
inequality, approval of the current income distribution, interest in changing the 
distribution of income and perception of change in the distribution of income are not 
necessarily related to individual incomes. There is no simple model that relates any of 
these four dependent variables with changes in individual income. 
Instead, people's ideas about the distribution of income seem to be related to 
certain personal characteristics, captured by the proxies for voting behavior, union 
membership, exposure to economic education and gender. These characteristics seem to 
alter the respondents' ideas about the distribution of income in general, as well as the 
possibility of changing income distribution. 
I think that a major influence on whether someone will advocate change or 
criticize the current income distribution is whether or not the person thinks change is 
possible in the first place. Many people responded to the question asking if they wanted 
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change by saying, "No, because nothing will every change anyway." Thinking social 
change is impossible makes it hard for people to visualize the change they would like to 
see. 
A second area of findings in this section has to do with the likelihood that a 
person believes the income distribution has changed. Here we begin to see the importance 
of local characteristics and personal characteristics of the respondent. The data showed 
that the perception of local and personal economic changes are significant in predicting 
whether a person thinks the national income distribution has changed. I will return to this 
idea in upcoming sections, but this is the first time we have encountered what I will call 
the "peer income groups." I will argue that people tend to experience certain worlds in 
the economy, i.e. an Oberlin graduate working as a researcher occupies an entirely 
different economic world than skilled workmen in the Ford plant, despite the fact that 
they might earn close to the same income. One's ideas about the economy come in large 
part from the peer group one is a part of. 
Income and income difference 
The next series of questions we must tackle have to do more explicitly with 
income. How much income do people think they have relative to other people? How 
much do they think other people have? Do they think they are well-off? What determines 
how well they can identify where they stand on the scale of incomes in the United States? 
Are they satisfied with their income? With their wage? 
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My analysis in this section will use several variable and I would like to start by 
discussing briefly how they were constructed. The first, what I will call "actual income," 
is the median income of the street the respondent lives on. This data comes from 1990 
census data. What I call "perceived income" is the income the respondent believes they 
have relative to others. I showed each respondent a schematic illustration of income 
quintiles, numbered from one to five. After being told those households at one were the 
poorest 20 percent, those at five were the richest, and three was right in the middle, I 
asked them to indicate what number they think their household would be. This number 
was then translated into an income based on current income distribution figures. 
I constructed another variable, income difference, from these data. It is the 
difference between actual and perceived income. Median income is the median income of 
the respondent's community and income satisfaction captures the respondent's level of 
income satisfaction on a 3-pt scale. 
Table 10 is graphical representations of both actual and perceived income. They 
show that perceived income tends to be below actual income, that my sample has a 
relatively high median income and that distribution of perceived income is more uniform 
than that of actual income. 
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The first question to ask of these data is straightfOIward. What is perceived 
income? What variables influence how much money someone thinks they have? 
The first logical answer is how much money they do have. This assumption turns 
out to be wrong. Regressing perceived income on actual income results in a highly 
insignificant, negative relationship: 
Table 11. Perceived income regressed on actual income 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 38809.23 9772.221 3.971382 0.0003 
ACTINCREAL -0.006724 0.212472 -0.031649 0.9749 
R-squared 0.000026 Mean dependent var 38508.78 
Adjusted R-squared -0.026289 S.D.dependentvar 14473.66 
S.E. of regression 14662.67 Akaike info criterion 22.07270 
Sum squared resid 8.17E+09 Schwarz criterion 22.15715 
Log likelihood -439.4541 F-statistic 0.001002 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.476155 Prob(F-statistic) 0.974918 
Another way of looking at this relationship is on a scatter graph, where it is clear there is 
no linear relationship between the two. 
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This could be telling us two things: first, it could be the proxy I am using for 
actual income is inaccurate. Instead of asking respondents how much money they earn I 
used data from the census bureau of the median income of a given street and used that as 
a substitute for reported household income. While there is sure to be some error in this 
method, I argue that people tend to live around people who earn about the same as them, 
especially in relatively dense settlements like the communities in the sample. 
I argue the non-relationship between actual and perceived income instead shows 
that perceived income is not as simple as how much someone earns. I will argue and 
show that perceived income is a function of more localized features of income and 
population, i.e. people compare themselves to those people around them and to the people 
they consider part of their peer group. 
Median income, the median income of the community that each respondent lives 
in, has a closer relationship with perceived income, although the relationship is still 
insignificant. Table 13 shows the regression of perceived income on median income. 
Table 13. Regression of perceived income onto median income. 
Dependent variable: Perceived income 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 45889.78 10593.17 4.332014 0.0001 
MEDINC -0.219399 0.307349 -'0.713844 0.4797 
R-squared 0.013232 Mean dependent var 38508.78 
Adjusted R-squared -0.012735 S.D. dependent var 14473.66 
S.E. of regression 14565.53 Akaike info criterion 22.05941 
Sum squared resid 8.06E+09 Schwarz criterion 22.14385 
Log likelihood -439.1882 F-statistic 0.509573 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.520136 Prob(F-statistic) 0.479686 
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This regression show that as the median income of a community increases, the 
respondent's perceived income falls. Although the errors are large, the trend is interesting 
and leads us to another, more telling, regression: the sign of the income difference 
variable onto median income. 
The sign of the income difference variable captures whether a respondent over- or 
under-estimated their income. With measures as rough as those I have developed for both 
actual and perceived income, this is a better variable to use than simply income 
difference. The variable, which is called "posnegincdiff' in the regressions, takes on a 
value of one when the respondent underestimated their income and a value of zero when 
they overestimated their income. Table 14 is a regression of median income, race, sex, 
union membership and age onto this variable. 
Table 14. Regression of sign of income difference onto selected variables. 
Dependent variable: sign of "income difference." 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z-S tatistic Prob. 
C -9.258293 3.685556 -2.512048 0.0120 
MEDINC 0.000107 5.98E-05 1.783394 0.0745 
RACE -11.97999 26775878 -4.47E-07 1.0000 
AGE 0.108420 0.052991 2.045993 0.0408 
SEX 2.023084 1.054500 1.918524 0.0550 
UNION -1.220534 0.987543 -1.235931 0.2165 
INEDU 0.493922 0.318083 1.552806 0.1205 
Mean dependent var 0.725000 S.D. dependent var 0.452203 
S.E. of regression 0.290991 Akaike info criterion 0.851924 
Sum squared resid 2.794298 Schwarz criterion 1.147478 
Log likelihood -10.03848 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.958787 
Restr. log likelihood -23.52675 A vg. log likelihood -0.250962 
LR statistic (6 df) 26.97655 McFadden R-squared 0.573317 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000146 
Obs with Dep=O 11 Total obs 40 
Obs with Dep=1 29 .. 
This regression shows several significant things. First, as the median income of a 
community increases, the probability that someone living there will underestimate their 
income also increases. Similarly, there is a positive relationships between age and 
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education and the probability someone underestimates their income. The regression also 
shows that women are more likely to underestimate their income. The two groups that the 
regression shows to be more likely to overestimate their income are African Americans 
and union members. The high probability on the race variable probably comes from the 
fact that each African American in the sample also came from communities with low 
median incomes. This correlation makes interpretation difficult. However, all of the 
remaining variables, excluding union membership, are significant. 
These findings can be explained by looking at the work of Robert Frank discussed 
above. If someone earning $30,000 lives in a place where the median income is $20,000, 
they will feel well-off. But if they move to a place with a median income of $40,000 they 
will feel more poor. 
The significance of age, education, race and sex add to this argument. It seems 
that people in the same demographic groups (age, gender, race and class) think similarly 
about their incomes. Older people tend to underestimate their income, as do women, 
more highly-educated people and people from poor neighborhoods. African Americans 
overestimate their income. Thus, it is one's peer group, not one's income that predicts 
how one sees one's income. These results confirm that people determine how "well" they 
are doing by comparing themselves with people not only in their communities, but in 
their general peer group as well. 
The numbers here suggest also that people from relatively high income sets 
(whites, older people, people from rich neighborhoods, highly educated people) are most 
likely to underestimate their income. Proof of this assertion, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. It appears to be an interesting proposition, however. 
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Income satisfaction 
Another variable, income satisfaction, shows again that the respondents' peer 
groups are important in determining people's attitudes toward their income. In Table 7 
income satisfaction is regressed on a range of variables, including income, education and 
job-related variables. A range of variables are regressed onto income satisfaction, 
providing the following results: 
Table 15. Income satisfaction regressed on selected variables 
Dependent variable: income satisfaction 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.612129 0.599311 1.021389 0.3147 
MEDINC 4.30E-05 2.18E-05 1.973436 0.0571 
PERCINC 7.44E-06 6.49E-06 1.147653 0.2596 
ACTINCREAL -3.11E-05 1.54E-05 -2.016004 0.0523 
INEDU 0.018497 0.066307 0.278961 0.7821 
EMTYPE -0.145840 0.158162 -0.922095 0.3634 
R-squared 0.158381 Mean dependent var 0.894737 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026878 S.D. dependent var 0.559414 
S.E. of regression 0.551845 Akaike info criterion 1.792841 
Sum squared resid 9.745063 Schwarz criterion 2.051407 
Log likelihood -28.06398 F-statistic 1.204391 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.358984 Prob(F-statistic) 0.329441 
The coefficients of the income variables are interesting. First, income satisfaction 
is negatively related to actual income, suggesting that as people have more income they 
are less satisfied with it. This finding coincides with Frank's work discussed above. 
Interestingly, the perceived income variable is insignificant, suggesting that income 
satisfaction is better-explained by actual rather than perceived income. 
This regression also seems to shows that education is not related to income 
satisfaction, but further investigation shows that there is a relationship, but it is non-
linear. Consider the following graph: 
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This graph show the mean level of income satisfaction squared divided into 
education level groups and arranged from least to most education. The shape suggests a 
V-shaped function between the two variables, where satisfaction levels are high with low 
levels of education, low with middle levels of education, and high with high levels of 
education. The trough of the V represents those people with trade school and some 
college, but not a degree. Those on the right have college and post-graduate degrees. 
Those on the left have no high school and high school. 
A similar pattern is found when you examine the squares of another variable, fair 
pay, with respect to education, although it is a little less pronounced. Consider Table 17. 
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The graph show a similar trend to that above, a V-shaped relationship between 
fair pay and education. Again, this emphasizes the importance of peer income groups 
when people evaluate how well they are doing. High school graduates don't expect to be 
as well-off as people with some education or trade school, but often find themselves 
"farther" or "as far" as these people. This leaves the high school graduate feeling better 
about their income, and the trade school graduate feeling worse, since school is 
consumed with the expectation that you will earn more with a degree. 
Just as with other variables discuses in this section, income satisfaction is a 
function of who the individual is and their personal background. 
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Differentiation and Equality 
Now that we have examined how people feel superficially about income 
inequality, and explored what tools people use to determine how well-off they are, I am 
going to tum to people's ideas about equality and differentiation in the abstract. Several 
variables capture these ideas. First, one variable captures whether the respondent prefers 
to live in an economically diverse or homogeneous community. Second, I asked why they 
had the preference they did, and lastly, I asked people to name down-sides to greater 
economic eqUality. 
About two-thirds of respondents say they prefer diversity to homogeneity in their 
neighborhood. Several groups, however, are significantly more likely to prefer living in a 
diverse place. Using Anova analysis, it is clear that people in different communities have 
significantly different preferences for diversity: those people who live in Oberlin and 
Lorain prefer living in economically diverse places, people in Sheffield Lake and 
LaGrange are mixed, and people in Avon Lake prefer homogeneity. This finding is 
significant at the .009 level. So what could be driving this pattern? There are several 
options. For one thing, Oberlin and Lorain are the only two communities with a minority 
population to speak of. 10 So, in so far as economic diversity implied racial diversity in the 
respondents' minds, these two statistics could be related. Another clear pattern is that the 
communities more interested in diversity have lower median incomes, and those 
uninterested have higher median incomes. 
10 Lorain in 24 percent minority; Oberlin is 28 percent minority 
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A scatter graph plotting median incomes and interest in diversity, both sorted by 
community, shows this relationship clearly. As communities become wealthier, their 
residents become less interested in economic diversity. Consider Table 18. 
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A regression of the two shows this relationship numerically. Consider Table 19. 
Table 19. Average interest in economic diversity by community regressed onto median income of 
community. 
Dependent variable: average interest in diversity, by community. 
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The pattern shown in these findings implies that. Since poorer respondents were 
more likely to wish to live in an economically diverse neighborhood, this pattern shows 
that poor people have more to gain from living around rich people than rich have from 
living around poor. 
The next question on the survey asked people why they felt the way they did 
about local economic diversity. The responses to this shed more light on this issue. They 
are summarized in Table 20. 
Table 20. Reasons given for support! opposition to local income diversity. 
Reasons 
Don't know 
Incenti ve for poor 
Teach tolerance to rich 
Everyone learns to get along 
Good in own experience 
*People are more comfortable 
*Less conflict 

























Table 20 shows that those people who prefer diversity overwhelmingly prefer it because 
it allows people to learn from each other and learn to tolerate differences. A handful of 
people identified particular benefits for either the poor or the rich, i.e. the poor would 
develop a work incentive, the rich would learn tolerance, but even those fit into the 
general category of learning to get along and appreciate differences. Those who prefer 
homogeneity, however, think that conflicts would be reduced, and everyone would be 
more comfortable living around people that are like them. 
If people generally seem to say they prefer diversity in their communities, what 
would they say about greater equality in general? Diversity is appealing to people 
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because it lets them learn from each other and appreciate differences. Does this imply 
then that people don't like equality because it is restrictive? 
The answer is yes. People tend to be hesitant about wanting greater equality, 
mostly because greater equality would change the system that they feel rewards work, 
education and experience. A change in the distribution of income would prevent people 
from being rewarded for work, and cut down on entrepreneurial spirit and creativity, as 
many people said. Some also mentioned fear that the poor would waste their additional 
income as a downside to greater equality. The fact that those people who said this had the 
highest median income of ~y group is telling. Table 21 summarizes the responses to the 
question asking people to name down-sides to greater economic equality in the United 
States. 
Table 21. Downsides to equality 
Downsides 
Don't know 
Would be unfair reward system 
Poor would mismanage money 
No down-sides 
Prices would rise 





















After examining a range of demographic, employment-related and income 
variables, none were found to predict significantly who said there were "no downsides" 
to greater equality, partly because that sub-group - with just seven people - is so small. 
Dynamics of change and power 
Lastly I want to discuss briefly the mechanisms through which people think 
economic change and individual advancement is made. Since people seem to think our 
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income system is pretty fair, or at least hesitate to change it, what mechanisms do they 
think make it operate? I will examine several variables to aid in this discussion, including 
one that asks people to name things that cause people to move up economically. Another 
identifies any groups which people believe have an easier time advancing economically. 
Over 70 percent of respondents named education as the best way for individual to 
move up economically. Other answers included hard work and motivation, positive home 
atmosphere and good values and smart financial management. Clearly people believe that 
economic success is a function of skillievelleducation, and the work and values that the 
person brings with them. 
The discrimination variable shows that most people do not believe racial or 
gender discrimination prevents people from moving up economically. Over half, or 55 
percent, of respondents said discrimination played no role in who is able to succeed 
economically. Of the rest, 28 percent felt women are discriminated against, and 16 
percent that African Americans and other minorities are. Women and African Americans 
were no more likely to think discrimination plays a role than other people. 
These numbers help explain why people are so hesitant to wish for greater 
equality; most people seem to think that the right people are rewarded for their work and 
skills; most do not think discrimination plays a role. Although many mentioned that 
people who come from well-to-do families to start with will have an easier time 
succeeding, they do not condemn it; they merely note it. 
Another dynamic worth future consideration is that of change in the distribution 
of income, a variable discussed in the first section of the paper. Along with the question 
asking people if the income distribution has changed, individuals were asked to name 
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what they think caused the change in distribution that they observed. Answers ranged, but 
fit into some general categories. The responses are summarized in Table 22. 
Table 22. Reasons for overall change 
Reasons 
Change in availability of jobs 
Politics, (i.e. unions, taxes, min wage) 









Unfortunately the jobs category is very broad; it includes people who think there 
are fewer good jobs, people who think jobs have left the country and people who think 
there are more jobs, as well as several others. It is interesting, however, that the bulk of 
people see income distribution as a clear result of the job structure and availability of 
jobs, not the party of the president in office, not the political make-up of a local area, not 
the overall level of education, or others. A handful of people identified "political" causes, 
like the power of unions, changes in the minimum wage, or the political party in control 
of Congress. Another set of people identified social values rather than politics. These 
people think the change has occurred because people are too consumerist and don't value 
money or work anymore. A number of people also identified growing debts, credit card 
as causes of change. 
The emphasis ,on jobs reinforces the idea that equality would harm the system of 
rewards we have. If people believe that hard work and education will earn you economic 
success, the only bump in the road would be that you can't find ajob. Thus people who 
on one hand say the distribution of income is changing "for the worse" - that rich and 
poor are become more separated - can on the other hand say that the system of rewards 
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we have in place operates efficiently and well. They can say this because the problem, the 
glitch, is with the job structure, not the system of different incomes. 
There are two ways this process could work. First, it is possible to argue that the 
ideology of the free market, liberty and freedom is so powerful in the United States that 
when something comes along to contradict it, like the perception that incomes are 
becoming more dichotomized, people must seek an alternate explanation that will satisfy 
them. In this case it comes down to jobs - the loss of jobs overseas, the closure of plants, 
the increase in low-pay, low-skill work. Another approach would be to argue that people 
assess the state of the economy by looking at their own experiences and the experiences 
of those people living around them. People's strongest connection with the "economy" as 
they see it, is in their job. Thus when people observe changes in the economy they seek 
explanations through what they know - jobs. This explanation suggests that those people 
who instead see change operating through politics or values might experience the 
economy most directly through those spheres, rather than employment. In actually the 
truth is probably somewhere in between, but is it important to note the importance of 
jobs. 
In conclusion, people tend to have a good deal of faith that the free market, and 
thus the income inequality that comes with it, is the best way to organize work in our 
society. Most people appear to think the income system in the United States rewards 
education, work and experience, as they think it should. However, this does not preclude 
the fact that many people also observe situations and trends that they don't support and 
that they think are unfair. When these things arise, however, it seems that people tend to 
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blame a concrete entity or a concrete trend, i.e. tax loopholes, jobs moving overseas, or 
unions, rather than critiquing the structure as a whole. 
Conclusion 
In the nature of an exploratory study this research raises more questions than it 
answers. Although certain relationships between certain variables have been shown to be 
significant and interesting, the whole picture is still foggy. Although I am able to draw 
some conclusions, I want to stress that a full understanding of perceptions of income 
inequality will only come as there is more data from a wider population, perhaps 
controlling for different kinds of social and political climates. 
Despite my hesitancy to draw hard and fast conclusions, the analysis suggests a 
few strong patterns. First, income is irrelevant as a social force unless you take into 
account the specific economic, social and geographic climate. In an extreme example, 
being rich, and more importantly feeling rich, in Manhattan is different than feeling rich 
in rural Kentucky. My research suggests that a less obvious assertion is also true: being 
rich in Lorain is different than being rich in Avon Lake. People seem to have very 
localized conceptions of income distributions; what is most important is to be at the top 
in their community. Millionaires and billionaires might exist, but most Americans don't 
come in contact with the very wealthy on a regular basis, making them irrelevant in most 
individuals' own income distribution model. 
Perhaps this is an answer to the question political scientists and labor historians 
have asked for some time: Why have Americans resisted socialism and class identity so 
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completely? One answer, or one part of one answer, could be that while someone might 
be poor they won't feel it so much if their life is led in a generally poor world. 
In addition to local and regional effects on perceived income, certain social 
characteristics seem to contribute to a person's economic world. Education, for example, 
is one that was discussed in this research, but I think it is likely further research would 
find race is also important. African Americans are more likely to compare themselves to 
other African Americans rather than the rest of the V.S .. population. 
Further research should focus on people's ability to judge differences in income 
rather than overall questions about inequality in general. I wish I had asked a question 
that let people place themselves and other people on an income distribution scale for the 
V.S., for their community and perhaps for the county or state. 
Beyond this, I would just like to see research with more observations and a more 
diverse sample. 
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Appendix A LaGrange, Ohio 
1970 1990 
Number of households 790 1,626 
(1970, families) 
Poverty rate 7.6% 6 % 
Percent minority .10% 3% 
Median income $10,359 $38,109 
Gini coefficient .2317 .2928 
Most common occupations Operatives Precision craftsmen 
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Number of households 3,036 5,394 
(1970, families) 
Poverty rate 3.2 % 3% 
Percent minority .l5 % 3% 
Median income $11,400 $43,660 
Gini coefficient .2561 .2699 
Most common occupations Craftsmen, foremen Executi ve/managerial 
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Avon Lake, Ohio 
Appendix A Lorain, Ohio (Sheffield area) 
1970 1990 
Number of households 6393 13385 
(1970, families) 
Poverty rate 17.2 % 20% 
Percent minority 23 % 24% 
Median income $11,102 $22,695 
Gini coefficient .2593 .3046 
Most common occupations Operatives Service (except protective) 
Craftsmen, foremen Machine operators 
Clerical Skilled craft 
Lorain income distribution-1990 
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Oberlin, Ohio 
Appendix A Sheffield Lake, Ohio 
1970 1990 
Number of households 2,007 3,414 
(1970, families) 
Poverty rate 5.8 % 5% 
Percent minority .10 % 2% 
Median income $10,847 $35,246 
Gini coefficient .2607 .2635 
Most common occupations Operatives Service 
Clerical Clerical 
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Appendix C Sample Survey 
How long have you lived in [community]? Where else have you lived? 
How many people live here in this house with you? Are any of them children? 
Were you at work last week? Did you work full-time or part-time? What sort of work do 
you do? How long have you had your current job? Do you expect to stay in this job for 
awhile? What other jobs have you had in your life? 
(IF UNEMPLOYED) have you looked for work in the last month? Have you worked full 
time since high school? 
Does anyone else in the household earn money? What work do they do? 
I'm going to ask you a question about how satisfied you are with your household's 
income: Do you think your yearly income is far below, below, enough, more than enough 
or far more than enough for you to support your household with? 
(IF BELOW OR FAR BELOW) About how much more income per year would you need 
to feel like you have enough? 
Think about your household's economic security. Do you think your household is more 
secure, less secure, or about as the same as you were five years ago? 
Now think about your household in 10 years. Do you think you will be more secure, less 
secure or about the same. 
Now think about your household's standard of living. By this I mean what sort of things 
you can afford to buy and do. Do you think your standard of living has improved, 
declined or stayed the same in the last five years? 
How about in the next 10 years, what do you expect to happen? 
Now look at this diagram. Imagine each of these categories represents 20 percent of the 
U.S. population arranged from richest at the top to poorest at the bottom. For example 
this is the poorest 20 percent of the population and this is the richest 20 percent. The 
dark line here is the poverty line; those households below it have incomes below the 
official poverty line. Which group, A through E, do you think your household belongs to? 
Have you been in this group for all of your adult life? (IF NO) Did you move up or 
down? 
How about when you were growing up, which group would you say your family was in? 
Do you think it is good that there is such a wide spectrum of incomes in the U.S? Why or 
why not? 
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I'm going to ask a few questions about the distribution of income. When I say 
"distribution of income" I mean the number of households that are rich compared to the 
number that are middle class compared to the number that are poor. Does that make 
sense? 
Do you think the distribution of income has changed in the United States in the last 20 
years? (IF YES) How so? 
Can you think of any things you think have caused these changes? 
(IF THEY HAVE LIVED IN COMMUNITY FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS) Do 
you think the income distribution in LaGrange has changed since you moved here? 
(IF YES) How so? 
If you could change anything about the way incomes are distributed in the US what, if 
anything, would you want to change? 
What do you think will actually happen to the distribution of income over the next 20 
years? 
Some people say they think there should be more income equality in the United States. If 
there was to be more equality, can you name any "down-sides" to that change? What 
about advantages, can you think of any? 
What things do you think cause a person to move up, economically, in the U.S.? 
What kinds of things make a person move down? 
Are there any groups that have a particularly easy time helping themselves? 
Who? 
Do you think that children are better off growing up in a community where the other 
children are like them, or a place where some are better off and some are worse off than 
them? 
Now I'm going to ask a few questions that refer to your job and workplace. 
What are your responsibilities at work; what exactly do you do on a day to day basis? 
What kinds of skills, training and talents did you bring to your job? Do you feel that you 
use those on a daily basis; do you find your job challenging? 
Considering the work you do, do you think you are underpaid, overpaid, or paid about 
the right amount? 
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What do you think the range of annual income, from lowest to highest, is in your 
workplace? 
Why do you think there are these differences? How are their jobs different? 
Now I am going to read to you several different scenarios about people receiving different 
amounts of pay. For each, tell me first if you think the scenario is common, rare or in 
between. Then tell me if you think the scenario is good or bad (i.e. Do you think that is 
how it should be). 
An experienced journalist, who gets to chose her own assignments, gets paid more than an 
inexperienced journalist who has little freedom on the job. 
Two teachers in the same school district, the same school and with the same years of 
experience earn somewhat different wages; the one with a masters degree earns more than 
the one without. 
The assembly-line workers at a factory, who are in a union, earn more per year than their 
supervisor who is not in the union. 
A company decides to pay one employee more because she has more children than 
another; their jobs are the same and they have the same qualifications. 
Next I am going to read you a few statements about equality and inequality in the U.S. 
For each one first tell me if you disagree strongly, disagree, are neutral, agree or agree 
strongly. Then tell me if you hear the statement, or statements like it, never, rarely, 
sometimes, often or all the time. 
The United States has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the industrialized 
world. 
There are fewer and fewer well-paying jobs in the U.S. for workers with just a high school 
education. 
Most people who aren't able to succeed economically could ifthey tried harder. 
A lot of the changes we are seeing in our economy are due to globalization. 
Women are more likely to be poor than men. 
Now I've just got a few more questions about your habits, background and opinions. 
Have you ever studied economics or business? 
Do you subscribe to a newspaper? Which one? 
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Do you read economic or financial news on a regular basis? (IF NO) Why not? 
What is the highest level of education you have received? 
some high school 
high school 
some college 
technical or trade school 
BA 
post graduate 
Has anyone in your household received more education? 
Did you vote in the Nov. 3 election? 
Did you buy any kind of lottery ticket last week? 
Are you a member of a trade union? 




Appendix D: Correlation Matrix 
ACTINCREAL AGE CHILD2 ECON INEDU EMYRS FUTURE 
ACTINCREAL 1.000000 -0.037675 -0.096315 0.036301 0.219818 0.078194 -0.198287 
·AGE -0.037675 1.000000 -0.468740 -0.057302 -0.059017 0.358891 -0.480629 
CHILD2 -0.096315 -0.468740 1.000000 0.032343 0.353812 -0.295549 0.442773 
ECON 0.036301 -0.057302 0.032343 1.000000 0.367404 0.249139 -0.118848 
INEDU 0.219818 -0.059017 0.353812 0.367404 1.000000 0.304582 -0.163326 
EMYRS 0.078194 0.358891 -0.295549 0.249139 0.304582 1.000000 -0.540832 
FUTURE -0.198287 -0.480629 0.442773 -0.118848 -0.163326 -0.540832 1.000000 
PAST -0.291748 0.200444 0.311870 -0.082238 0.269722 0.134797 0.135205 
LOTT 0.002829 0.189584 -0.093250 0.043355 -0.073817 0.429500 -0.440556 
MARR -0.276941 -0.515015 0.625620 -0.004545 0.160954 -0.475079 0.692742 
NAT 0.047415 -0.005417 -0.088588 -0.199435 -0.342512 -0.124407 -0.024475 
NEWS 0.159093 -0.137732 0.000000 -7.98E-18 0.195859 0.122801 -0.108234 
PERCINC 0.007356 -0.217253 0.311068 0.307600 0.147981 -0.116576 0.319326 
RACE -0.539536 0.008075 0.208514 -0.058168 0.026410 -0.251689 0.197023 
SEX -0.250922 -0.238691 -0.072232 -0.447774 -0.285893 -0.367105 0.172733 
. UNION -0.057754 0.394043 -0.484544 0.300376 0.004262 0.374808 -0.343850 
VOTE -0.050308 0.279260 0.202043 0.245681 0.285427 0.248485 -0.233875 
YRSCOMM -0.220737 0.116271 -0.111270 -0.091764 -0.217405 0.036169 -0.035235 
EMEXP -0.243659 -0.278524 0.501322 0.240602 0.266272 0.167591 0.165538 
DUAL 0.026556 -0.413048 0.325042 0.044777 0.091486 -0.233902 0.358105 
GOVTSP -0.422804 0.465865 -0.159177 -0.318800 -0.352814 -0.145852 0.089985 
PAST LOTT MARR NAT NEWS PERCINC RACE 
ACTINCREAL -0.291748 0.002829 -0.276941 0.047415 0.159093 0.007356 -0.539536 
AGE 0.200444 0.189584 -0.515015 -0.005417 -0.137732 -0.217253 0.008075 
CHILD2 0.311870 -0.093250 0.625620 -0.088588 0.000000 0.311068 0.208514 
ECON -0.082238 0.043355 -0.004545 -0.199435 -7.98E-18 0.307600 -0.058168 
INEDU 0.269722 -0.073817 0.160954 -0.342512 0.195859 0.147981 0.026410 
EMYRS 0.134797 0.429500 -0.475079 -0.124407 0.122801 -0.116576 -0.251689 
FUTURE 0.135205 -0.440556 0.692742 -0.024475 -0.108234 0.319326 0.197023 
PAST 1.000000 -0.049917 0.251170 -0.124792 0.000000 0.139797 0.022324 
LOTT -0.049917 1.000000 -0.262071 0.050000 0.301511 -0.251273 9.03E-18 
MARR 0.251170 -0.262071 1.000000 -0.052414 0.173838 0.252292 0.164083 
NAT -0.124792 0.050000 -0.052414 1.000000 0.000000 -0.066256 -0.178885 
NEWS 0.000000 0.301511 0.173838 0.000000 1.000000 -0.020787 -0.247207 
PERCINC 0.139797 -0.251273 0.252292 -0.066256 -0.020787 1.000000 0.145143 
RACE 0.022324 9.03E-18 0.164083 -0.178885 -0.247207 0.145143 1.000000 
SEX 0.077331 -0.129099 0.121800 0.090370 0.000000 -0.166198 0.076980 
UNION -0.009607 0.144338 -0.514443 -0.346410 -0.159571 0.102602 -0.193649 
VOTE 0.393789 0.166667 -0.052414 -0.100000 0.184257 0.195197 -0.124226 
YRSCOMM 0.257927 -0.079263 -0.129801 0.306128 0.056840 -0.131808 -0.185861 
EMEXP 0.320297 0.216777 0.304508 -0.229784 0.000000 0.473600 0.271448 
DUAL -0.017185 -0.129099 0.568399 -0.051640 0.000000 0.118495 0.076980 
GOVTSP 0.242513 0.131306 -0.034412 0.006565 0.000000 -0.221438 0.205527 
Appendix D: Correlation Matrix 
SEX UNION VOTE YRSCOMM EMEXP DUAL GOVTSP 
ACTINCREAL -0.250922 -0.057754 -0.050308 -0.220737 -0.243659 0.026556 -0.422804 
AGE -0.238691 0.394043 0.279260 0.116271 -0.278524 -0.413048 0.465865 
CHILD2 -0.072232 -0.484544 0.202043 -0.111270 0.501322 0.325042 -0.159177 
ECON -0.447774 0.300376 0.245681 -0.091764 0.240602 0.044777 -0.318800 
INEDU -0.285893 0.004262 0.285427 -0.217405 0.266272 0.091486 -0.352814 
EMYRS -0.367105 0.374808 0.248485 0.036169 0.167591 -0.233902 -0.145852 
FUTURE 0.172733 -0.343850 -0.233875 -0.035235 0.165538 0.358105 0.089985 
PAST 0.077331 -0.009607 0.393789 0.257927 0.320297 -0.017185 0.242513 
LOTT -0.129099 0.144338 0.166667 -0.079263 0.216777 -0.129099 0.131306 
MARR 0.121800 -0.514443 -0.052414 -0.129801 0.304508 0.568399 -0.034412 
NAT 0.090370 -0.346410 -0.100000 0.306128 -0.229784 -0.051640 0.006565 
NEWS 0.000000 -0.159571 0.184257 0.056840 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
PERCINC -0.166198 0.102602 0.195197 -0.131808 0.473600 0.118495 -0.221438 
RACE 0.076980 -0.193649 -0.124226 -0.185861 0.271448 0.076980 0.205527 
SEX 1.000000 -0.124226 -0.272543 0.195807 -0.167915 0.022222 0.152564 
UNION -0.124226 1.000000 0.112263 0.116262 -0.025031 -0.260875 0.189525 
VOTE -0.272543 0.112263 1.000000 -0.170666 0.231229 -0.272543 -0.065653 
YRSCOMM 0.t95807 0.116262 -0.170666 1.000000 -0.196345 -0.211848 0.502669 
EMEXP -0.167915 -0.025031 0.231229 -0.196345 1.000000 0.078360 -0.056929 
DUAL 0.022222 -0.260875 -0.272543 -0.211848 0.078360 1.000000 -0.406838 
GOVTSP 0.152564 0.189525 -0.065653 0.502669 -0.056929 -0.406838 1.000000 
Appendix E: Regression 
Table 1. Regression of "suppdist" onto demographic and income variables, excluding actual income. 
Dependent Variable: SUPPDIST 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 05115199 Time: 18:09 
Sample: 140 
Included observations: 39 
Excluded observations: 1 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic 
C 1.329510 0.852705 1.559168 
PERCINC -1.28E-06 1.62E-05 -0.078919 
RACE -1.113892 0.820919 -1.356885 
SEX -0.373068 0.496922 -0.750758 
UNION -1.194308 0.544710 -2.192559 
VOTE -0.879557 0.604021 -1.456169 
INEDU -0.013124 0.161678 -0.081174 
ECON 0.523007 0.588493 0.888724 
Mean dependent var 0.538462 S.D. dependent var 
S.E. of regression 0.487557 Akaike info criterion 
Sum squared resid 7.369074 Schwarz criterion 
Log likelihood -22.04408 Hannan-Quinn criter. 
Restr. log likelihood -26.91724 Avg. log likelihood 
LR statistic (7 dt) 9.746317 McFadden R-squared 
Probabilit~(LR stat) 0.2034 11 
Obs with Dep=O 18 Totalobs 
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